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In the Supreme Court 
Of the state of Utah 
ST.ATE OF l7T.-\H. 
ESTHER BES.ARES. 




The defendant, charged 'vith first degree murder, was 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter on June 7, 1929, by a 
jury in the District Court of Weber County, Utah, Judge 
George S. Barker presiding. and appeals. 
The victim, one Jack Farish, was stabbed with a butcher 
knife at a bootleg joint in Ogden, after midnight, April 8, 
i929, and died on the way to the hospital. 
Thelma Bruerton, a daughter of the defendant, was in 
charge of the place. Algernon Bruerton, Thelma's husband~ 
was then in the county jail under sentence for violating the 
liquor law. The house is an old residence situated on Twen-
ty-fourth Street near the Post Office and has been remod-
eled for the illicit use. Entrance is into a living room in 
the middle of the structure. On the east is a sewing room; 
on the west are two bedrooms; north of the living room is 
the dance hall; east of the dance hall, reached by a narrow 
hallway, is the kitchen. 
The situation at the joint was evidently getting out of 
hand on account of Thelma's looseness, and the mother-
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a large, plain, hard-working, matronly woman-exasperated 
and outraged at the carryings on, went there in the eve-
ning of the night of the tragedy to try to hold things down 
and see that no greater harm should come to her errant 
daughter. Thelma, the blubbery type, a starry-eyed blond 
gone fat, is nevertheless a mother's only child. 
Farish and the daughter baa been on a debauch for a 
couple of days and nights and were still going strong. 
Moonshine whisky, with home-brew for chasers, was freely 
imbibed by all except the mother. This concoction, in mixed 
company, behind closed shutters, is the devil's caldron. 
Farish was pretty full and Thelma was sloppy drunk. Far-
ish furnished the hard liquor and the house supplied the 
beer. 
Nine persons were on the premises when the stabbing 
occurred, but only three were· produced as witnesses at the 
trial. Mr. and Mrs. Marsh, who lived in a room in the 
house, and a Mr. Wolsky had left the State for parts un-
known. Thelma, although present in court throughout the 
trial, under subpoena by the State, was not sworn by either 
side. An adopted son of the defendant was sleeping in the 
bedroom. 
Max Pace, weasel faced, cook and barber, who did not 
work much at either, and Bob Field, card sharp and a battle-
scarred veteran of the Ogden Police Court, pals of Farish 
(habitues of the underworld all three), were witnesses for 
the State, and the defendant testified in her own behalf. 
Sundry doctors, undertakers, plain clothes men, deputy 
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sheriffs and character 'vitnesses added bih;; of formal fact 
here and there, but are not included in the record on appeal 
since nothing of signifil!ance to our point appeared from 
their contributions. 
The theory of the prosecution \vas that since the de-
fendant "~a~ there and held the knife that did the deed 
she ought to be found guilty of something. The jury, seem-
ingly, took that 'iew also and returned a verdict for the 
lowest grade of homicide permitted under the court's in-
structions. 
The record reveals a nasty mess. The only orchid on 
the dung hill i~ the mother instinct \Yhich flared into livid 
flame in defense of a daughter's tattered soul. 
The testimony which we bring up on the appeal covers 
less than a hundred pages of transcript (Tr. 2-95) and is 
condensed to ten pages of abstract ( Abs. 11-20) . 
Pace, for the State, testified that Farish and he started 
to lea\e the house and that Thelma said she was going too; 
that as these three were at the street door going out to-
gether, the mother forbade Thelma to go; she called Farish 
vile names and the daughter struck the mother and the 
two women engaged in a scuffle; that they fought across 
the room into the dance hall; that Farish followed the melee 
to the other doorway; that Field and Pace grabbed Wolsky, 
who started toward Farish, and "oozed" him into the 
kitchen; that the defendant broke away from her daughter 
and ran into the kitchen and returned with a long butcher 
knife and stuck it through Farish under the left ribs as 
he was standing in the doorway between the front room 
and the dance hall. Fields said he came in after the argu .. 
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ment started and witnessed the affair, taking part only to 
the extent of aiding in the "oozing" of Wolsky. 
The defendant gave a different version. The reading 
or the relating of it is nauseating. She testified that the 
party had quieted down about midnight and Farish and 
Thelma were in the kitchen alone. The mother ·was play-
ing solitaire in the front room. The coUple had been ex-
hibiting amorous tendencies as the evening wore on and 
the mother became alarmed at the length of the period of 
quiet which followed the racket of the brawlers. She werlt 
into the kitchen to see what might be going dn, and came 
upon Farish in an unnatural act with Thelma. The abstract 
quotes her testimony in description of the debasing scene 
and recital of the ensuing events. (Abs. 18-20.) 
It pictures a whirlwhid of passion, aroused by tlie sud-
den confrontation of the horrid defilement of her daugh-
ter, and the slaying in the heat engendered by the sight of 
the deceased's perverted deed. 
Our position at the trial was, and is now, that the taking 
of life under these circumstarices is justifiable homicide 
fdt whieh the mother must be ful1y acquitted and discHarged 
und~t the high law of tiattir~ and the statutes of this State. 
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.-\ssignment of Errors Nos. IV'., .. , Vl. \'11, VIII, IX, X, 
XI, and XII t.-\bs. 25-~8). 
This appeal presents ~, point of first impression in this 
jurisdiction. or else\Yhere, so far as '"e have been able to 
find from the books, namely : 
Is a1z act of Sf.rual pe-rt•ersion by the male a defilement 
pf the fem.ale? 
It inYolYes the construction of Subsection 4 of Section 
8032. Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917. This provision reads: 
8032. Homicide is also justifiabl~ when com-
mitted by ~Y person in eith.er of the following 
cases: 
4. "nen committed in a sudden heat of pas-
sion caused by the atte111pt of the deceased to com-
mit a rape upoJl or to defile th~ ~f~, daughter, sis-
ter, mother, or other female relative or dependent 
of t~e accused, or when the defilement has actually 
been committ~. 
This t;tah statute defining justifiable homicipe con-
taips :grovi~ions t~t are wholly ~que, a~d t}lis is perhaps 
the first case to be appealed in which these unusual pro-
visions have had a direct application since their adoption 
into the body of our Code. 
This provision is more than the '~u~w:ritten law" enact-
ed into statute, and it is not a d~clarf!tiQp of the common 
law, which merely reduced the slaying from, :Ql.Q.rder to man-
slaughter, and it seems to go far beyond the limits of the 
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statutes of any other State. Somewhat similar statutes are 
in effect in New Mexico and Texas. 
The New Mexico statute reads: 
Code 1915, Section 1468. Any person who kills 
another, who is in the act of having carnal knowl-
edge of such person's legal wife, shall be deemed 
justifiable; provided, that said husband and wife 
are not living separate but together as man and 
wife. 
This section has been interpreted by the Supreme Court 
of that State in two cases: 
State vs. Carabajal, 193 Pac. 406, 17 A. L. R. 
1098. 
State vs. Greenlee, 269 Pac. 331. 
The Texas statute reads: 
Homicide is justifiable when committed by the 
husband upon the person of any one taken in the 
act of adultery with his wife; provided, the killing 
takes place before the parties to the act of adultery 
have separated. Penal Code, Article 567. 
Cited in: 
Price vs. State, 18 Texas Appeals 474, 51 Am. 
Rep. 322. 
And: 
46 s. w. 369. 
67 s. w. 411. 
74 s. w. 307. 
94 s. w. 1041. 
165 s. w. 583. 
160 s. w. 465. 
180 s. w. 254. 
243 s. w. 1093. 
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See also: 
Biggs vs. State, 29 Georgia 723, 76 Am. Dec. 
638. 
The Contmon Law is stated by Blackstone: 
··so if a man takes another in the act of adultery 
"ith his 'vife. and kills hin1 directly upon the spot, 
though this ""as allowed by the laws of Solon, as 
likewise by the Ron1an ciYillaw (if the adulterer was 
found in the husband's own house), and also among 
the ancient Goths. yet in England, it is not abso-
lutely ranked in the class of justifiable homicide as 
in the case of a forcible rape, but it is manslaughter. 
It is, however~ the lo\\-est degree of it; and therefor 
in such a case the court directed the burning in the 
hand to be gently inflicted, because there could not 
be a greater provocation. 4 Bl. Com. (Chitty) side 
page 191." 
And Bishop states the common law rule thus: 
''If a husband finds his wife committing adul-
tery, and provoked by the wrong instantly takes her 
life or the adulterer's * * * the homicide is only 
manslaughter. But if on merely hearing of the 
outrage he pursues and kills the offender, he com-
mits murder. The distinction rests on the greater 
tendency of seeing the passing fact, than of hearing 
of it when accomplished, to stir the passions; and 
if a husband is not actually witnessing the wife's 
adultery, but knows it is transpiring, and in an over-
powering passion, no time for cooling having elapsed, 
he kills the wrong-doer, the offense is reduced to 
manslaughter." 2 Bish. Crim. L. (7th ed.) Sec. 708. 
It would seem that at common law the rule reducing 
the offense from murder to manslaughter was limited to 
the case of a cuckold. The statutes of Texas and New 
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Mexico, it will be observed, likewise apply only to the situ-
ation of a husband who is confronted with the adultery of 
his spouse. 
In some cases, however, the principle has been applied 
where a father o~ brotper kills one wpom he detects in adul-
tery or :sexual intercourse with his daughter or sister or 
where one kills a man d~tected in sexual intercourse with 
his betrothed, and in like cases. 
29 C. J. 1143, notes 66, 67, 68, and 69. 
One of the citations in the annotation is referred to as 
~'~n unnatural offense wjth defendant's spn." 
Reg. vs. Fisher, 8 C. & P. 18~, 34 E. C. L. 679. 
We do not have access to this report. It is the only citation 
we have been able to find in which the circumstance: of an 
-qnp.3tq.ral ~ct is considered in connection with the principle 
involved. 
The Utah statute has twi~e b~en pefore this court in 
cases pn ~PP.~al. 
PeppJe vs~ ~~lliQ.ay, 5 Utah 467, 17 Pac. 118. 
State vs. Botha, 27 Utah 289, 75 Pac. 731. 
' . - . 
In ~ach of these cases, the slayer was th~ husbftnd, and 
sought to justj(y upder th~ Utah law. 
The reason for the st~t~te is well ~t~t~d ip. State vs. 
Greenlee, supra. 
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··The purpose of the la\v is not vindil'tive. It 
is humane. It ret•()g-nizt.'~ t h~ ungo\'t'rnnbll' pa~~ion 
"~hicb p(..1$St'sses a n1an \Vht.'n inllllt'tUat t.'ly t·onfron tt.'d 
\vith his "·ife's di$honor. It mert'ly ~ay~ the man 
·who tnkes life under tho~e circun1~tances is not to 
be punished: not bel~ause he has pt'rformed a mer-
itorious deed; but because he has aL"tecl naturally 
and humanly. '"' e in N e,,. :\Iexieo have enacted, as 
has been enacted in Texas. that. instead of mitigat-
ing the homicide to manslaughter. as at common 
law. such circumstances justify the act. Such is the 
holding of the Texas. lJtah. and Georgia decisions 
cited. and such is appellant's contention here." 
.A. reading of the l"tah statute at once discloses that 
it is not liiPited to th~ case of husband sl~ying wife or 
paramour as are the enactments in Texas and New Mexico. 
Br its terms the statute applies where the defilement is of 
the wife, daughter~ sister. mother or other female relative or 
dependent of the acc'ijsed: and the j'ijstificatioiJ runs in favor 
of any person who stands in the relationship of husband of 
the defiled mfe, father or mother of the defiled daughter, 
brother or sister of the defiled sister, son or daughter of a 
d~ed mother, and in fact any relative pf a female who is 
defiled. The statute goes even to the extent of justifying 
homicide where there is no relationship by blood or mar-
riage, but merely the fact of dependency. No distinction 
i~ made between father and mother ; parenthood alone in-
vok~ the rule. A mother may take the life of tpe defiler 
of~ qaughter jn t:P~ same circ-qmstances as wHI s}lield the 
f~tll.~:r, ap.d with U~e i:nupunity. 
A q9estjon that i~ not 14i4 by tb~ terms of the statute 
jt~~lf js the meaning pf the word "qefile." I! ere j q.qichd 
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construction and interpretation is necessary in its applica-
tion. This court in the Botha case considered and approved 
an instruction defining defilement as it related to the facts 
of that case. There was no question of an unnatural act. 
The claim of justification was simple adultery with the 
accused's wife. 
The trial court in our case adopted the instruction con-
sidered in the Botha case and gave it as the definition of 
defilement. It is instruction No. 12, reading as follows: 
(Abs. 6.) 
"The defilement of a female, as meant by these 
instructions, is accomplished when any male per-
son, not the husband of such female, has had sexual 
intercourse with such female, and the attempt to 
defile a person has been accomplished when such 
male person has attempted to have sexual inter-
course with such female. The fact of the defilement 
or attempted defilement may exist where the female 
has given her consent to such sexual intercourse, 
as well as when she has not given her consent." 
This instruction as well as instructions No. 13, No. 14, 
and No. 15 (Abs. 6-8), limit defilement to sexual inter-
course. 
Instruction No. 12, as given, is good as far as it goes. 
The defendant requested this instruction as well as an 
amplification of the definition of defilement contained there-
in to cover all of the facts in the case and particularly de-
fendant's defense. Defendant's requested instruction No. 23 
is divided into six paragraphs. The court endorsed it as 
follows: "Given in part, refused in part, subject covered 
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by instruction given:· The latter part of the endorsement 
is hardly a correct staten1ent. The whole subject of our 
request was not covered in the instructions as given. No 
where in the charge to the jury is there any statement that 
our statute applies to a situation of sexual perversion such 
as was disclosed as the cause of this homicide. 
The court's attention ''"as specifically directed to this 
matter in the third paragraph of requested instruction No. 
23 (.-\bs. 4). which reads: 
"Likewise. an act of sexual perversion, or an 
attempt to commit an act of sexual perversion, such 
as cunnilingus, is a defilement. within the meaning 
of these instructions." 
The instructions as given by the court entirely evade 
and avoid this whole issue. It was defendant's principal 
justification. Her testimony is not seriously disputed on 
the record. The deceased's affront to decency provoked 
the transport of passion which resulted in the stabbing. It 
was not an act of sexual intercourse ; it was an act of sexual 
perversion upon the person of this defendant's daughter. 
A situation more calculated to arouse, outrage and inflame 
could scarcely be conceived by the normal mind. Coming 
upon a daughter in the act of nature may or may not pro-
voke a parent to the desperation of homicide; but it can 
hardly be imagined that any father or mother could re-
strain the compelling impulse to slay on being confronted 
with the revolting posture of indecency which was exposed 
to the view of this defendant on entering the kitchen. 
The trial judge, for some inexplicable reason, did not 
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touch the subject in his instructions. Either such an act 
is a defilement within the meaning of the statute or it is 
not, and it was the plain duty of the court to inform the 
jury as to what the law was upon this matter, indeli~ate 
though it may pave been. The law must sometimes deal 
with life in t:Q.e raw. A mere sqqearp.ishness will not excuse 
a failure to face unpleasant facts. The jury was not in-
formed al}d was left wholly unjnstructed qpon. the crux of 
defendant's justification and in th~ argum.ent we were 
not permitted to state the law to be other or piff~r~p.t from 
what the court had said it was in the instructions as given; 
and so the defen~ant's defense could not be adequately and 
fully presented and she was prevep.ted from having a fair 
trial upon the facts of her case ap.d the law appli~able there-
to. 
Will any court in Christendom say that the unnatural 
act is not a qefilement of the victimized female? lf it is 
a defilement within the purvi~w of oqr statute, then tl}is 
case ou~ht to be reversed al}.d the defend~nt ~iven a trial 
to a jury that is informed as to what th~ l~w is upon the 
facts of her defense. 
fOINT II 
Assignment qf Errors VI (Abs. 26). 
Another p~~t of o~r reqqested in~trqctiop. ·No. ~3, wbich 
WftS refused an~ ;not gi ve:q py the coJJrt re~ds ~s follo~,s 
(Abs. 4) : 
"If the jury believe from the evidence in this 
case that the deceased, Jack Farish, had se~ual in-
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ten.~~..)ur~e ''"ith the daughb.'r l)f the deft'tainnt, or 
attempted to haYe ~uch in tercour~t' with ht.'r. or 
was about to takt:~ her away fron1 ht'r honH' for that 
purpose, or that the df'c·ca1.~t'ti conlmitft'd an act of 
scJ.~ual perrcrsio11. or afte1nptnf to commit an act of 
sf.rual perz'er~ion. upon the daughtt.'r of the defend· 
ant. and if the jury further belieYe fron1 the evi-
dence that the defendant killed the deceased, Jack 
Farish, in a sudden heat of passion, and if the jury 
further believe from the eYidence that said sudden 
heat of pa~s.ion 'vas caused by the said conduct of 
the deceased, then the jury should find the defend-
ant 'not guilty.' " 
Here again by the italicized portion of the request, the 
Court's attention was directed to the proposition that an 
act of sexusl perversion, or an attempted act of perversion, 
upon the daughter of the defendant, was sufficient to invoke 
ihe statute and justify the homicide, if seeing it caused the 
heat of passiOii which tesulted in tlie g}ayjng. 
The whole charge in this case upon the question of 
defendant's defense of justification under the statute is 
shot through with the vice so frequently condemned by this 
court in former decisions; namely, that the instructions are 
mere abstract statements of principles of law, and not spe-
cific as to the facts of defendant's defense. 
State vs. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071. 
POINT III 
Assignment of Errors VII (Abs. 27). 
The eonciudlbg sentenc~ of requested insttuctidfi No. 
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23 reads (Abs. 4): 
And if, from all of the evidence in the case, the 
jury have a reasonable doubt as to the facts of jus-
tification under this instruction, it is the duty of the 
jury to aequit the defendant. 
No where in its instructions to the jury did the trial 
court give this or a similar statement of the law upon the 
subject of justification due to the passion aroused from 
catching the daughter and the deceased in the illicit act. 
Such an instruction was given by the court as applied to 
justification on the ground of self defense, which also ap-
peared from the evidence. This court in several decisions 
has approved the proposition that where the evidence of 
justification raises a reasonable doubt of guilt, it is the 
duty of the jury to acquit the defendant. 
State vs. Vacos, 40 Utah 169, 120 Pac. 4.97. 
State vs. Dewey, 41 Utah 538, 127 Pac. 275. 
State vs. Harris, 58 Utah 331, 199 Pac. 145. 
It is not the burden of the defendant to prove the cir-
cumstances of justification beyond a reasonable doubt. We 
sought to have this undisputed proposition applied to the 
other circumstance of justification in this case. It is re-
spectfully submitted that the failure of the court to so 
instruct the jury was prejudicial error and that the judg-
ment ought to be set aside on this further ground. 
POINT IV 
Assignment of Errors II and III (Abs. 25-26). 
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The defendant requested a binding instrul·tion that 
she could not be found guilty of murder in either the fir~t 
or second degree, and the refusal of these requested instruc-
tions is assigned as error. ...-\ny examination of the testi-
monv in this case. '"e believe "·ill convince the court that, 
even wholly disbelieving and disregarding the defendant's 
story and considering only the version given by Pace and 
Field, the case is at ffil)St one of voluntary manslaughter. 
It was unfair to the defendant to put her to the jeopardy 
of a finding of guilty on the murder charge. If the jury 
had been instructed that they should consider only the 
question of manslaughter or not guilty under the plea of 
justification, we have no doubt but that they would have 
come to the decision .of ''not guilty." 
To permit the verdict by compromise to stand in this 
case would be a stark denial of justice. 
POIXT v"'" 
.A.ssignment of Errors I (Abs. 25). 
\\ ... e also assign as error a question of evidence. The 
cross-examination of ~Irs. Besares took a wide field and 
the District Attorney was permitted to engage in the tactic 
of unlimited harassment and repetition on repetition. He 
finally proceeded to examine the defendant as to the pur-
pose of other people being in the premises. Over objection, 
the defendant was compelled to answer the following ques-
tion: 
"Mr. Marsh went there for the express purpose of car-
rying on the booze business there, didn't he?" 
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We submit this question had no place in the case; that 
it was not cross-examination; that it was wholly incom-
petent, irrelevant and immaterial, whether Marsh went 
there for the purpose of carrying on the booze business or 
not. The de£ertdant was not on trial for nuisance a:hd Marsh 
was not on trial at all. The question was manifestly cai-
culated to stir the prejudice of the jury against the de-
fendant for being in tlie place and we submit the ruling 
constitutes another prejudicial error. 
The argument made covers the grounds relied upon for 
the motion for :hew trial, the denying of which is likeWise 
assigned as ettor. (Abs. 28.) 
Respectfulty submitted, 
WOOLLEY & HOLTHER, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant. 
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